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In a Gilded Cage
Abstract
The Oxford history of the United States may be the most prestigious series of American history survey
volumes in print. Originally launched under the aegis of C. Vann Woodward and Richard Hofstadter, it
embraces at least three Pulitzer Prize-winners—James M. McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War
Era (1988), David M. Kennedy’s Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945
(1999), and Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought? The Transformation of America, 1815–1848
(2007)—plus two other Pulitzer nominations and a Bancroft Prize in 1997 for James Patterson’s Grand
Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974.
There have been some misfires. Charles Grier Sellers’ Jacksonian America, 1815–1846 (1991) was so
unabashed in its Marxist blatherskite that it was withdrawn from the series and published as a separate
volume. H.W. Brands’s account of the Gilded Age, Leviathan: America Comes of Age, 1865–1900 (2007), was
yanked at the last minute, too, without comment from Oxford—but not without suggestions that Brands was
too complimentary to industrial capitalism. (Oxford published it anyway, as a stand-alone.) Benjamin
Schwarz, then the Atlantic’s literary and national editor, gave the series the back of his hand in 2006, dismissing
all but the volumes by Robert Middlekauff (on the Revolution) and McPherson as “bloated and intellectually
flabby,” lacking “intellectual refinement, analytical sharpness, and stylistic verve.” [excerpt]
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The Oxford history of the United States may be the most prestigious series of American history 
survey volumes in print. Originally launched under the aegis of C. Vann Woodward and Richard 
Hofstadter, it embraces at least three Pulitzer Prize-winners—James M. McPherson’s Battle Cry 
of Freedom: The Civil War Era (1988), David M. Kennedy’s Freedom from Fear: The American 
People in Depression and War, 1929–1945 (1999), and Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God 
Wrought? The Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (2007)—plus two other Pulitzer 
nominations and a Bancroft Prize in 1997 for James Patterson’s Grand Expectations: The United 
States, 1945–1974. 
There have been some misfires. Charles Grier Sellers’ Jacksonian America, 1815–1846 (1991) 
was so unabashed in its Marxist blatherskite that it was withdrawn from the series and published 
as a separate volume. H.W. Brands’s account of the Gilded Age, Leviathan: America Comes of 
Age, 1865–1900 (2007), was yanked at the last minute, too, without comment from Oxford—but 
not without suggestions that Brands was too complimentary to industrial capitalism. (Oxford 
published it anyway, as a stand-alone.) Benjamin Schwarz, then the Atlantic’s literary and 
national editor, gave the series the back of his hand in 2006, dismissing all but the volumes by 
Robert Middlekauff (on the Revolution) and McPherson as “bloated and intellectually flabby,” 
lacking “intellectual refinement, analytical sharpness, and stylistic verve.” 
* * * 
Schwarz’s estimate of the series will not be improved by its latest offering, Richard White’s The 
Republic for Which It Stands: The United States during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, 
1865–1896. Despite Dr. Johnson’s offhand dictum that no one but a blockhead ever wrote but for 
money, it is still surpassingly rare that an author begins by announcing—as White does—that he 
wrote his book because “I needed the money.” But his larger motivation clearly lies in his 
conviction that the current Age of Trump is simply a replay of the Gilded Age, and that Gilded 
Ages are “easier to describe and analyze as an historian than indulge or endure as a citizen.” 
The Gilded Age America he describes was conceived under a delusion, and dedicated to a 
proposition mixing equal parts racism, sexism, capitalism, individualism, elitism, deception, 
fraud, and degradation. The era’s delusion was fostered by no less than Abraham Lincoln. 
“Americans had, unknowingly, conceived twins in 1865,” White writes on the introduction’s 
first page. “The first twin embodied the world they anticipated emerging from the Civil War, and 
it died before ever being born. The second, unexpected, twin lived, forever haunted by its 
sibling.” 
White’s first “twin” is free labor—the idea that in an open and democratic society, citizens enter 
marketplaces without let or hindrance and sell their labor to whoever will buy. It was an idea 
born of John Locke, matured in the English-speaking world by John Stuart Mill and the 
Manchester School, and articulated in its clearest fashion by Lincoln: 
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus 
with which to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors on his own account another 
while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him. This, say its advocates, is 
free labor—the just and generous, and prosperous system, which opens the way for all—
gives hope to all, and energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to all. 
But it was all for nothing, declares White. At its inception free labor was a fraud. It never drew 
an honest breath after 1865, if it ever drew one. Prudent, penniless beginners are invariably the 
prey of their predecessors, and can succeed in no other way than by forcibly expanding into other 
people’s domains and subjugating them. Each expansion is cloaked in fraud and lies, and since 
the freedom to contract for one’s own labor is nothing more than a different kind of slavery, the 
likely result is prosperity for the deceitful, manipulating few who corruptly obtain control of the 
outcomes. 
What kept free labor such an attractive bait, says White, was its near-kin ideology of the 
“home”—the promised reward for those serving the free-labor Moloch. But the home itself 
teemed with oppression and abuse. It “embodied all the gendered and racialized assumptions of 
American republicanism and the American economy,” and its defense was the excuse for 
inflicting “horrendous violence and repression” on “Chinese, blacks, Indians, and to a lesser 
degree some European immigrants.” It is not clear from White’s telling whether the home 
inflicted greater degrees of slavery on men or women, or why he is reluctant to admit that, in 
1870, one in five Americans owned their own home, and immigrants purchased and owned 
homes at greater rates than the native-born—but he’s confident that the home’s ultimate product 
was Lizzie Borden and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. 
Oddly in White’s narrative, free labor, which is supposed to have been dead-on-arrival at the 
close of the Civil War, has a Monty-Python-like capacity for getting up and insisting it’s happy. 
Free labor, White declaims, was dead in 1865; it is, nevertheless, alive in the mid-1870s to 
provide “a fraying bridge over a widening class divide.” It is not yet dead when Thomas Edison 
opens his laboratory in Menlo Park, nor in 1889, when Mark Twain’s A Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court transports the industrious Hank Morgan to medieval England to upset the 
Round Table. But whenever its shelf-life finally expires—whether in the hands of Richard 
Ely’s The Past and the Present of Political Economy(1884) or the members of the Farmers’ 
Alliance—it is accompanied by the realization that “individualism, contract freedom, and 
laissez-faire” are “a set of anachronisms utterly out of step with modern conditions” which must 
be replaced by distributive government’s controlling hand. 
Corruption is the malevolent “twin” that survived free labor to become the evil genius guiding 
the Gilded Age’s economy and governance. “The Gilded Age was corrupt, and corruption in 
government and business mattered.” Not that White believes anything could have prevented this: 
corruption sprang naturally from democracy’s soil, as unfettered voters persistently elected 
politicians (like Ben Butler) whom their betters (like Charles Eliot Norton and Richard Henry 
Dana) knew to be unfit. A controlling, distributive government might, at least on some counts, be 
understood as a synonym for corruption, but not here. 
White’s indictment of corrupt Gilded Age Solons is a long one. But none draws his venom more 
than Ulysses S. Grant. The two administrations of the victor of Appomattox and suppressor of 
the Ku Klux Klan have quite a donkey’s tail of scandals pinned to them—Jay Gould, the 
Whiskey Ring, Credit Mobilier, the Belknap bribery. None of them actually involved Grant. No 
matter: White’s hatred of Grant is maniacally relentless. Grant’s “financial and economic 
policies…all contributed to a rich stew of disappointment and alienation” while he “accepted the 
favors of rich men bestowed in the name of a grateful nation” and was “always susceptible to the 
flattery of the wealthy.” And in his lowest of low blows, White does not hesitate to snarl that, 
after the dying Grant raced his last clock to complete the Memoirs which rescued his family from 
penury, we should be grateful that he “ran out of time to write about his presidency.” 
* * * 
There is misery to be recounted in the Gilded Age, as no doubt there is in the age that preceded 
it, and no doubt in this one. But the misery of White’s Gilded Age has a manufactured air. We 
are told that immigrant farmers were impoverished by the American landscape—and that it was 
the productivity of that landscape which forced them to leave their Austro-Hungarian hovels and 
journey to the American free-labor Gehenna. White’s account is also narrow, in terms of 
geography (his America frequently vanishes to little more than Chicago and New York City), the 
economy (western railroads), and people (urban immigrants). We never actually learn much 
about manufacturing output, imports and exports, or the complexities of the tariffs (the 
1885 Tribune Almanac needed 19 pages to describe the scope of the 1883 tariff legislation but in 
White it gets none). The U.S. Navy’s rebirth in the 1880s, from its post-Civil War erasure, gets 
no mention; neither do diplomatic affairs (including the purchase of Alaska), the Fall River Line, 
women’s colleges, public lecturers, the great bicycle craze, nor the dime novel. State 
governments only bob into view when a strike needs suppressing—this, despite the fact that the 
Gilded Age was the paramount era of state government activism. The telephone is the subject of 
exactly three paragraphs (largely to note how Alexander Graham Bell converted it into “a 
monopoly and profit”), and Joseph Glidden, who invented barbed wire in 1873, doesn’t even get 
a sentence—thus telescoping the two Gilded Age inventions which most transformed American 
spaces into almost nothing. 
* * * 
The intellectual history of the Gilded Age is even more invisible: William James gets two pages, 
John Dewey one, Josiah Royce and Charles Sanders Peirce none. Baseball, that great Gilded Age 
cultural confection, earns just one reference, on how racist its professional membership became 
and the reserve clause’s resemblance to slavery. Booker T. Washington barely merits a glance. 
Winslow Homer, Charles W. Chestnutt, John Singer Sargent, Sarah Orne Jewett, Edwin 
Arlington Robinson, Ida Tarbell, John Philip Sousa, Washington Roebling, Amy Beach, Nat 
Love, George Whitefield Chadwick, Louisa May Alcott, and Theodore Thomas have no 
existence worth White’s notice. 
You do not have to love the Gilded Age to sense something terribly awry in White’s grinding 
recitation of its nastiness, or his single-minded focus on economic immiseration. One can feel 
nothing but shame for the nation he describes—and it is hard not to believe that the infliction of 
shame is White’s principal purpose, more than even money or politics, in writing the book. This 
is also an America that my Irish great-grandfather, James P. Kerrigan, would have stared at 
incredulously. A man of the Gilded Age, and a railroad-worker, he died of gangrene from 
stepping on a rusted rail; but it never occurred to him to curse the United States from his 
deathbed for his bad lot in life. It is White’s complete failure to connect people like James 
Kerrigan with the hopeless story he lays out in The Republic for Which It Stands which puzzles 
me, and would have infuriated my great-grandfather.  
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